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Know Your Enemy: Local Taxation and Tax Agreements in Indian Country
Anthony S. Broadman1
Intergovernmental disputes between tribes and their neighbors have educated
states about tribal sovereignty. What many state governments have learned,
through litigation, political battle, and intergovernmental dispute, is that even
when states have “won” tax disputes, they have lost.2 This dependably pyrrhic
result has driven rational state actors—state taxing authorities acting consistently
with their own best fiscal interests—to pursue negotiated agreements. Today,
state-tribal tax compacts, while often controversial,3 are commonplace.
Counties and cities, on the other hand, with some admirable exceptions, have yet
to learn, or heed, lessons from inter-local tax disputes. As it stands, tribes must
be prepared for future battles over local taxation in Indian Country, particularly in
regard to real or personal property owned by tribes. But as counties and
municipal governments slowly learn the lessons already learned by the states,
tribes should also be ready to negotiate intergovernmental solutions to inter-local
tax disputes.
The Backdrop in Brief
Disputes between states and tribes are not a recent phenomenon. Indeed, in
1831, the seminal Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,4 which involved Georgia’s
involuntary formation of “Cherokee County,” set the parameters of state-tribal
relations adhered to today. By 1885, in Utah & Northern Railway v. Fisher,5 the
U.S. Supreme Court had embarked on the county-tribe property tax dispute
odyssey—one that has usually harmed tribes. While high profile tribal-state
disputes continue to occur, a new generation of intergovernmental fights may
soon outnumber them.
States’ local components—counties, cities, and
municipalities—do not yet understand tribal sovereignty.
And as local
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governments, now more than ever, struggle to fund operations, county-tribe
disputes will arise.6
The tribal-federalist system puts tribes in the awkward position of possessing a
right to sovereign-to-sovereign relations with the United States and the individual
states, but still needing, at times, to act as local governments.7 Not surprisingly,
the jurisdictional overlap with other local governments drives tax disputes and
can sour local relationships. Within these inter-local tax disputes, it has been
clear that local governments often fail to perceive tribes as sovereigns.
Historically, counties have asserted taxing power over tribes in the property
context.8 This is doubly problematic for tribal governments because tribal
governments have a very different connection to tribal land than counties do to
county land. In addition, property taxation is philosophically difficult for tribal
governments because tribal land is thought of as being tax exempt; however, as
the Court has noted, “[g]eneralizations on this subject have become particularly
treacherous.”9 The exceptions to the general rule of tax-exempt tribal land have
formed the U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of local taxation in Indian Country.
For tribes, the wheels came off (or rather, the Court took them off) in the property
tax context over the course of several cases. In County of Yakima v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation10 and City of Sherrill v. Oneida
Indian Nation,11 the Court’s theory of interplay among local governments and
tribes crystallized.
In County of Yakima, the Court reaffirmed the general rule that states may not
tax reservation lands or reservation Indians unless Congress has authorized
state taxation and “made its intention to do so unmistakably clear.”12 But the
Court went on to hold, nevertheless, that in the General Allotment Act,13
Congress made its intention to permit local taxation of fee land on the Yakima
reservation unmistakably clear.14
The legal acrobatics employed to find
“unmistakable clarity” in the Allotment Act illustrated exactly how far the Court will
6
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go to uphold state or county taxing authority. In fact, the Allotment Act was so
unmistakably unclear in the taxation of on-reservation fee land that even the
United States joined the tribe in resisting the local tax.15
In 2005, in City of Sherrill, the Court rejected the Oneida Nations’ position that its
reunification of interests in particular parcels made such land non-taxable. But
when Madison County later sued Oneida to collect taxes, the tribe successfully
enjoined collection based upon the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.16 What
might have seemed like an appropriate assertion of tribal sovereign immunity put
the tribe at a crossroads when the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to take Madison
County’s appeal last year.
Madison County v. Oneida: A Bullet Dodged
The Supreme Court decided to hear Madison County v. Oneida in 2011, in part,
to determine “whether tribal sovereign immunity from suit, to the extent it should
continue to be recognized, bars taxing authorities from foreclosing to collect
lawfully imposed property taxes.” The case spelled disaster for the tribe.
Madison and Oneida Counties argued in their merits brief that “[t]ribal sovereign
immunity does not bar in rem foreclosure for nonpayment of real property taxes .
. . .”17 The Counties synthesized City of Sherrill and County of Yakima into a
proposed rule under which (1) the Court’s strongest sovereign immunity cases
were inapplicable as in personam rather than in rem cases18 and (2) that the
Court had already allowed something like what the Counties were asking for
when it found congressional authorization for taxation in County of Yakima.19 In
effect, the Counties were proposing a wholly novel in rem exception to tribal
sovereign immunity in the property tax context.
Had the Court heard the case and adopted the rule proposed by the Counties,
states, counties, and other enemies of tribal self-governance might have still
been barred from suing tribes. But the exception would have allowed the states
and their younger siblings to judicially take and sell tribes’ property. In adopting
the rule, the Court would have destroyed the very purpose of sovereign immunity
as universally applied—that is, to protect assets of many from depredation by
few.
The Oneida Nation seems to have recognized what was at risk, and wisely
mooted the dispute before the Roberts Court could rule on it by waiving its
15
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sovereign immunity for enforcement of real property taxation through foreclosure.
As a result, in early January 2011, the Court remanded the case to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.20
Taxation v. Collection
As illustrated by Madison County, tribes have employed a second layer of
defense in tax disputes: even when a federal court incorrectly upholds taxation in
principle, taxing authorities may lack the ability to collect. This approach does
not require a tribe to ignore a court’s judgment, or disrespect federal court
authority. Rather, independent barriers to collection prevent county taxmen from
realizing their putative victories. Indeed, it is an approach that federal courts
have implicitly endorsed, if not created.21
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Oklahoma,22 the Court recognized that, notwithstanding the challenges posed to
state taxing bodies by the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine, state and local
governments possess many “adequate alternatives” to collect taxes from tribal
governments.23 In particular, the Court encouraged states to “enter into
agreements with the tribes to adopt a mutually satisfactorily regime for the
collection” of taxes.24 Therefore the only practical route for local governments
seeking to collect taxes from tribes is one that has received the U.S. Supreme
Court’s imprimatur.
Adequate Alternatives
Heeding the Court’s direction, states have entered into compacts regarding
taxation of tribal lands and businesses. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of
1988 has also made compacts part of the intergovernmental vernacular.25 In this
era of intergovernmental cooperation, the Washington State Department of
20
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Revenue, for instance, has recognized that while states have leverage over nonIndians for taxation purposes, “[t]ribal economic development involves doing
business with non-Indians.”26 For Washington State, the Colville case, which
upheld taxes on nonmember tobacco buyers, was a “huge win on its face” but
because it was “[s]ilent on methods to enforce collection of state taxes,” the state
has recognized it was a “hollow victory.”27 According to the Department of
Revenue, the Colville case did not end conflict, did not increase collections,
increased intergovernmental tensions, and generally worsened relationships with
the tribes.28 As a result, Washington began entering into cigarette compacts with
tribes in 2001.
As opposed to the zero-sum Colville era,29 a new and more dynamic state/tribal
relationship exists today. As noted by Professor Matthew Fletcher,
States and tribes are beginning to smooth over the rough edges of
federal Indian law—jurisdictional confusion, historical animosity
between states and Indian tribes, competition between sovereigns
for tax revenue, economic development opportunities, and
regulatory authority—through cooperative agreements. In effect, a
new political relationship is springing up all over the nation between
states, local units of government, and Indian tribes.30
Once local governments begin to see tribes as partners and governments,
and the benefits of cooperative agreements become clear, the spring of
this new political relationship will arrive. Unfortunately, it will fall to tribes
to change this interpolitical paradigm and teach local governments that
compacts can be mutually beneficial.
Successful Compacts between Tribes and Local Governments
Many tribes and states understand that the future of tribal-state relations involves
In fact,
government-to-government negotiation, accord, and agreement.31
“[n]early every state that has Indian lands within its borders has reached some
type of tax agreement with the tribes.”32 Despite the examples that have winded
26
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their way up into the Court, many local governments are coming to recognize that
intergovernmental accord offers an alternative to realizing nothing from tax
disputes. Moreover, these agreements allow tribes to protect their interests
against enemies of tribal self-governance by achieving certainty regarding interlocal relations. Ideally, this certainty will keep tribes out of the federal courts.
The Southern Ute Indian Tribe and the County of La Plata, Colorado, for
example, have compacted to resolve property tax disputes. Under the terms of
their 1996 compact,33 the state and county agreed not to seek any tax on tribal
non-trust property. “Property” under the terms of the compact refers to both real
property and mineral lease interests, and applies to both ad valorem and
severance taxes.34 In recognition of the state and county relinquishment of
taxing efforts, the tribe agreed to make annual voluntary payments of
approximately one-third of the value of taxes that would have been collected if
the property were not tribally owned. If a dispute arises under the compact, both
parties have agreed to effectively waive their sovereign immunity by submitting to
binding arbitration.35
In addition, the Snoqualmie Tribe and the City of Snoqualmie in Washington
State have entered into a successful inter-local agreement.36 Under this
agreement, the tribe pays the city for police, fire, and emergency medical
services.37 The tribe pays for any additional amenities required by these
services, including the use of a jail cell or officer assistance.38 The compact also
provides for sewer lines to and from the tribe’s property.39
Moreover, in Louisiana, the Chitimacha Tribe and the Parish40 of St. Mary have
entered into a compact that exempts the tribe from parish tax.41 Essentially, this
JEANNE KAUFMAN, JOHN DOSSETT & SARAH HICKS, GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT: MODELS OF
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33
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compact grants the tribe a status akin to that of a 501(c)(3) non-profit
organization.
As illustrated by the three examples above, despite what local governments
might claim, tax agreements are possible. While county lawyers will often cite (1)
a general lack of authority to enter into such agreements and (2) a general lack
of centralized taxing authority to execute such agreements, those agreements
that exist suggest counties can find authority when they want to. Moreover,
counties themselves receive millions in Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILTS) every
year from the federal government.42 Clearly, solutions are possible.
And they are desirable. Tax agreements provide, at minimum, “some level of
predictable revenue” for both county and tribal governments.43 Agreements also
answer regulatory questions created by ambiguities in inter-local jurisdictional
authority, reduce the need for costly and contentious intergovernmental litigation,
and offer greater flexibility to accommodate the needs of state and tribal
governments.44 Further, intergovernmental tax compacts neatly fit on-the-ground
realities of taxation involving Indian tribal communities. The purpose of local
taxes is to “finance the activities of government in providing goods and services
to the public. Only those who benefit from the goods and services should pay for
them.”45
In many, if not most regions, state and local governments are already aptly
compensated for the services that they provide to tribal members.46 Under the
economics of “tax exporting,” it is frequently tribal governments—not state or
41
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local governments—who bear a disproportionate financial burden associated with
taxation vis-à-vis local services rendered.47 One study, for example, found that
“[o]n most reservations, there are few retail stores and tribal members must go
off reservation and pay state taxes on everything they buy. Nationwide, this
amounts to $246 million annually in tax revenues to state governments, while
states expend only $226 million annually on behalf of reservation residents.”48
Intergovernmental tax compacting allows for taxation to be commensurate with
services rendered, taking into account the unique relationships between tribes
and their neighboring jurisdictions.49
Conclusion
In the era of federal Indian self-determination, government-to-government tax
compacts provide tribal governments with a “proactive assertion of their right to
self government” that is necessary for economic and political independence.50
By reorganizing their taxing and other relationships with local governments, as
they have with states, and in turn exercising and strengthening tribal selfdetermination at the local level, tribal governments reduce their historic
dependence on the federal government.51 And “[e]ach time a state or local
government agrees to negotiate with an Indian tribe and . . . execute a binding
agreement . . . that non-Indian government is recognizing the legitimacy of the
tribal government,” and vice versa.52
47

See generally Alexander, supra note 45.
Tax Fairness and Tax Base Protection: Hearing on H.R. 1168 Before the House Comm. on
Resources, 105th Cong. (testimony of W. Ron Allen, President, National Congress of American
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lands. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 175 (1989).
49
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circumstances over time”). What is more, the phenomenon of intergovernmental agreements is
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jurisdictions. One study, for example, estimates that as of 1999, 45 states were using inter-local
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2008) (unpublished paper, William Mitchell College of Law) (on file with author). It is further
estimated that over 50% of all cities and counties use such inter-local agreements. Id.
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Tribes can and will fight inappropriate local government taxation in federal courts.
But litigation should be the last resort. Not only are federal courts unfriendly to
tribal interests, but, as compared to cities and counties, tribes have far more to
lose on their own behalf and on that of their sister tribes. Government-togovernment arrangements at the local level allow tribes to secure some measure
of certainty by binding counties, cities, and their future leaders.
The
intergovernmental agreement may be commonplace with states, but it is difficult
for their younger siblings to grasp.
Local governments may, at times, be the “deadliest enemies” of tribal selfgovernance.53 But times are changing. As tribes become more politically active
at the local and state government levels, there is a strong opportunity for them to
support state political candidates who are savvy about the contours of Indian law,
if not supportive of tribal sovereignty and self-governance.54 As difficult as it may
seem for tribes to stoop to the local governmental level, counties and cities will
not educate themselves. It is up to tribes to teach local government actors how
to behave like good neighbors, and secure the kind of jurisdictional and legal
certainty necessary for sustainable economic growth in Indian Country.
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